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A 2002 survey of 1089 Czechs and 501 Slovaks, as well as a more limited survey of Hungary,
and Poland, indicates that an individual may evade taxes in part if he believes he is receiving
substandard government services. We suggest that an individual￿s evaluation of the quality of
government services is not influenced by his need to justify his evasion. Self-reported measures
of morality show no correlation with evasion. This suggests that perceptions of government
services are not shaped by an individual￿s need to justify his evasion. This gives weight to our
finding that the perceived quality of government services influences evasion. The less quality of
government services an individual reports, the more likely he is to evade taxes. A 20% increase in
the perception that government services are of quality would lead to a 5% decrease in the number
of frequent tax evaders and a 12% increase in the number who never evade. Governments in
transition countries who suffer from weak tax collection apparatus may wish to transmit clear
information on the quality of their services in order to cut down on evasion.
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1. Introduction
Tax evasion is one of the central problems facing the governments of transition countries.
Corrupt tax officials, lack of resources to collect taxes, and populations versed in skirting
rules, force transition countries to adopt systems of taxation that unduly target those
narrow groups from who money can be extracted. This narrow targeting violates the
central principle of efficient taxation, which is to tax at low rates on a broad base. Tax
evasion raises what Browning (1976) calls the marginal cost of public funds.
Governments of transition countries have attacked the problem of tax evasion by cracking
down on evaders. The present paper suggests a supplementary approach might be in
order. In a survey of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland, we find
strong evidence that citizens will avoid taxes if they do not believe they are getting
quality government services for the taxes levied upon them.
At first this result may appear odd. Why should a rational factor the quality of
government services into his evasion decision? Theoretical models of why people evade
taxes hold that individuals will evade taxes the if they do not fear risk, and if find they
find low the chances of being caught and the penalty for being caught. These models
assume the worst of taxpayers. People will free ride on government services if not
whipped into paying their taxes. No theoretical model discusses the possibility that an
individual￿s perception of the quality of government service might influence his decision
to evade taxes. A similar omission can be found in research on why people vote. The
famous Downsian voter hypothesis suggests that people vote for instrumental reasons. If
no one believes they can influence the outcome of an election, no one will vote. The3
Downsian voter hypothesis is now in retreat in face of data studies (summarized in
Matsusaka and Palda 1993) showing it to lack explanatory power. Slemrod and Yitzhaki
have cast similar doubt on the instrumental tax evasion model. In a major survey of tax
evasion Slemrod and Yihtzaki (2000) have stated that the central mystery of taxation is
not why people evade taxes, but  why they pay taxes. The instrumental models of tax
evasion developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and a fleet of subsequent
researchers (surveyed in Palda 1998),  predict more tax evasion than we observe. The
chances of being caught evading taxes in the U.S. are minuscule. According to Slemrod
and Yitzhaki scarcely 1.5% of returns are audited and a small fraction of these is subject
to penalty.  As if ignoring these odds in favour of cheating, the majority of Americans
choose to pay their taxes to the full.
Whenever a model lacks explanatory power researchers must scramble to find the forces
that the model has overlooked. Our candidate for the missing force in tax evasion is the
citizen￿s perception of the quality of government services. This search is not just of
academic interest. We believe that governments wishing to reduce tax evasion must
attack the problem in a pincer movement. One flank of evasion must come under attack
from officers of the excise wishing to coerce citizens to pay. The other flank must be
turned by a government wishing to prove to its citizens that their money is being well-
spent.
Our research is of more than academic interest. We show that transition governments
could make significant gains in revenue if they raised the perceived quality of the4
services which they provide their citizens. By encouraging more people to pay their taxes
these transition countries could lower the deadweight cost associated with every dollar of
tax raised and so allow governments to undertake the investments needed to foster
economic growth.
To make our case we set in competition two theories of tax evasion. Using our survey
data we examine whether moral or instrumental reasons drive people to evade taxes. The
competition is a bit of a sham, as we believe that both factors push people to evade or
comply. The novelty of our approach is to have asked respondents to our survey whether
they are satisfied with the quality of government services they receive. We then ferret out
whether there is a relation between perceived quality and willingness to pay taxes. Our
data affirm this surmise.5
2. The Data
The goal of this paper is to seek out evidence that tax evasion is not just a product of
greed but may also be a form of legitimate protest by citizens against a government they
find to be inefficient and unresponsive to their needs. The first step in our analysis is to
explore a survey we conducted of the Czech and Slovak Republics in 2002, as well as a
more limited number for Hungary and Poland. Some results we present are comparable to
a survey we conducted in 2000, and where these results are comparable we present both
years. Our survey included 1089 Czechs and 501 Slovaks and was carried out by the
leading Czech survey firm Median in May of 2002. The detailed questionnaire we used is
attached in Appendix B. Appendix A contains a summary of some of the main variables
used in our analysis. The purpose of this section is to lay out the measures of tax evasion
we sought and to give the reader some idea of the characteristics of the population we
studied. We will then proceed to show the relation between tax evasion and a citizen￿s
belief that he is or is not getting quality government service for the taxes he pays.
As Giles (2000) explains, there are several ways to measure tax evasion: tax audit
surveys, money demand methods, latent variable techniques, tax overhang methods,
labour force surveys, and surveys asking individuals how much they evade. Surveys are
useful for understanding why individuals evade taxes at any point in time, whereas
macro-methods such as latent variable analysis and tax-overhang approaches are more
appropriate for time-series analysis of tax evasion.6
At present the only estimates of the underground economy for the Czech and Slovak
Republics are those of the Ministry of Finance which is primarily concerned about
collecting unpaid-backtaxes from firms. Until our survey, there were no independent
academic estimates of the size of tax evasion in the Czech and Slovak Republics. There is
a similar dearth of such estimates for other transition countries.
We have chosen the survey method of analyzing tax evasion because this method is rich
in demographic information. We can use demographic information to see what
characteristics of respondents are associated with evasion. The survey method also allows
us to ask respondents what they believe is the probability of being caught evading and
what penalties they believe they face, whether they believe evasion to be moral, and
whether they believe their wealth needs to be safeguarded by tax evasion, whether
government is giving them quality services for the taxes they pay. These subjective data
allow us to probe the effects of incentives on the decision to evade. Survey data suffer
from the lies respondents tell. We shall see that even though lying may pervade the data,
solid relations emerged between the questions we asked and whether people evaded.
The main problem we faced was in knowing how much tax people evade.  The obvious
problem when asking people about their participation in the underground economy is that
they will be reluctant to confess their participation. Our survey tackles this problem in
stages. First we ask respondents whether they know of anyone who has participated in the
underground economy. Respondents might not feel ashamed about answering this
question honestly. Knowing people who participated in the underground economy could7
be a weak signal that the respondent also participates. Next we ask whether the
respondent has ever bought goods or services in the underground economy. Finally, and
this is perhaps the question to which respondents will give the least honest reply, we ask
whether they have themselves ever participated in the underground economy and what is
the nature of this participation.
Tables 1a and 1b summarize the first (￿soft￿) level of inquiry of our survey. Table 1a is
from our 2000 survey (see Hanousek and Palda 2002) and Table 1b is from the present
2002 survey. These tables show the answer to what people thought about the size of the
underground economy. If people are rational observers of their surroundings, their
opinions about the size of the underground economy might be a fair estimate of the actual
underground economy. Giving an opinion about the size of the underground economy is
not likely to threaten a respondent so that we can expect the answers to be honest.
Table 1a: ￿Soft￿ measures of participation in the underground economy, 2000
Survey question CR SL Significant
difference
Percentage of adults in country having unreported
income
38.3 42.7 **
Percentage of neighbors having unreported income 33.2 38.8 **
Ever bought undeclared goods/services 49.4 50.0
Source: 2000 Survey data, authors￿ computation8
Table 1b: ￿Soft￿ measures of participation in the underground economy, 2002
Survey question CR SL Significant
difference
Percentage of adults in country having unreported
income 48.6 53.8 **
Percentage of neighbors having unreported income 37.4 38.9
Ever bought undeclared goods/services 55.3 54.4
Source: 2002 Survey data, authors￿ computation
Row 3 of Tables 1a and 1b summarizes the answers to more intimate questions than those
summarized in rows 1 and 2. Here we ask whether the respondent has ever bought goods
in the underground economy. The level of threat to respondents is greater here than in the
questions in rows 1 and 2, but still fairly mild, as there is no effective legal sanction for
those who buy goods from producers who evade taxes unless the law forbids sale of these
goods. There is no significant difference between what Czechs and Slovaks answered.
Both groups claim with equal frequency to have bought from the underground sector.
There is no contradiction between the finding that Czechs and Slovaks buy equally from
the shadow sector and the earlier finding that Slovaks believe the percent of people with
income from the shadow economy is higher than for the Czech Republic. Our questions
to respondents up to this point in the discussion have been sufficiently vague to allow for
several interpretations. Czechs and Slovaks may buy equally from the black market but
Slovaks may spend more in their purchases. To get a more precise idea of how much tax
people evade than the answers given to the questions in Tables 1a and 1b we need to put
the question of evasion to respondents baldly and hope that some respondents accept to
answer our questions.9
The most intimate questions in our survey ask the respondent with what frequency he has
worked and not declared his income and how much money he earned from activities upon
which he did not declare to the publicans.
Table 2a. Values and 95%-confidence intervals for relative frequencies of different level
of tax evasion. Czech Republic 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002.
Year Often Sometimes Never
3,2% 12,6% 84,2%
1995
(2,0%, 4,4%) (10,5%, 14,7%) (81,9%, 86,5%)
3,7% 16,7% 79,7%
1999
(2,4%, 4,9%) (14,3%, 19,0%) (77,1%, 82,2%)
3,9% 21,3% 74,9%
2000
(2,6%, 5,1%) (18,7%, 23,9%) (72,1%, 77,6%)
3,7% 20,2% 76,1%
2002
(2,5%, 4,9%) (17,7%, 22,7%) (73,4%, 78,8%)
Figure 1: Graphs for 95% confidence intervals
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Table 2b. Values and 95%-confidence intervals for relative frequencies of different level
of tax evasion. Slovak Republic 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002.
Year Often Sometimes Never
1,1% 8,0% 90,9%
1995
(0,0%, 2,2%) (5,4%, 10,6%) (88,2%, 93,6%)
1,3% 10,4% 88,3%
1999
(0,1%, 2,5%) (7,5%, 13,3%) (85,3%, 91,3%)
1,3% 13,5% 85,2%
2000
(0,1%, 2,5%) (10,3%, 16,7%) (81,9%, 88,5%)
2,6% 14,0% 83,5%
2002
(1,1%, 4,1%) (10,9%, 17,1%) (80,2%, 86,8%)
Figure 2: Graphs for 95% confidence intervals
Source: 2000 and 2002 survey data, authors’ computation
The above tables and graphs show a marked tendency for those who never evaded taxes
to be a diminishing group. In another paper (Hanousek and Palda 2002) we discussed
how those who have never evaded taxes are a shrinking group of society and how this
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The most intimate question we asked was simply how much tax a person evaded. Table 3
breaks down undeclared income into different income categories. This table is roughly
consistent with Table 2b. Nearly 30% of Czechs claim to have some undeclared in Table
3, whereas in Table 2b nearly 25% of Czechs claim to have evaded sometimes or often.
The statement seems less applicable to the Slovak Republic. Appendix C shows almost
identical trends for Hungary, and Poland.
Table 3: Distribution of undeclared income, 2002
Income range CR SR
None 72.8 83.5
<10,000 Crowns 14.8 9.8
10,000-15,000 Crowns 1.3 0.2
15,000-20,000 Crowns 0.5 0.2
20,000-25,000 Crowns 0.4 0.0
>25,000 Crowns 0.0 0.0
Rejected answer 10.2 6.3
Source: 2002 Survey data, authors￿ computation
Figures 1 and 2 show how evasion has evolved over the last seven years in the Czech and
Slovak Republics. Once again we must take care not to view the estimates of tax evasion
in the above tables as being accurate. Respondents might tell us how much they evaded
but there are two problems we must recognize while interpreting these responses. The
first problem with the estimates in Table 3 is that people lie about their incomes. Horry,
Palda, and Walker (1992) found that in surveys of consumer finances for Canada,
respondents consistently underreported their incomes by 10%. They were able to arrive at
this conclusion by comparing GDP imputed from the Canadian survey of consumer12
finances with GDP derived from the national accounts. If people lie about their legitimate
income, chances are they will also lie about their shadow income. The second problem
with the estimates in Table 3 is that some respondents chose to answer how much they
evaded and others chose not to answer. The self-selection of responses is a warning that
our sample of answers may not be representative of the population of answers. The
direction in which might go this potential selection bias is not clear. Those who answer
may have less to hide than those who do not answer. In this case answers would
underestimate the size of tax evasion. If the biggest tax evaders are also the least risk
averse people then sample selection could bias upward our estimates of the underground
economy.  If those who answered how much they evaded are a random mix of the above
two types then our estimate of the size of tax evasion will not be biased but may suffer
from a large variance.
Perhaps the most complicated problem posed by our measures of tax evasion is that it is
difficult, if not impossible in a survey to ask people exactly how much they evaded. We
can pose questions about the range in which their evasion might fall, but this form of
question bunches all the highest evaders into one group. We have no idea of the upper
limit of evasion in this highest group. Questions about how often people evade give us an
idea of the number of people participating in the shadow economy, but once again, their
answers do not accurately weigh the degree of their involvement. These potentially
frustrating aspects of the survey data are standard in this area of research and force us to
dose our findings with a heavy degree of interpretation and nuance.13
3. Quality and Willingness to Pay
3.1 Cross-Tabulations
The above overview of Czech and Slovak evasion speaks of two societies where tax
evasion seems to be pervasive.  Why should this be so? Opportunity is the answer that
leaps to mind. Czechs and Slovaks have a device for evasion at their disposal. Hundreds
of thousands of citizens declare themselves ￿consultants￿ to companies. While the
consultant sits in his company office, the company need not worry about paying social
security benefits and the so-called consultant may deduct from his taxes apartment,
travel, and food expenses. Czech and Slovak authorities have not yet caught up with this
variant of evader. Authorities have enough on their hands with the large corporate
evaders whom they estimate to be important and easily targeted cheaters of the
government treasury. Pervasiveness may be in the eyes of the beholder. We have no
benchmark against which to assess whether evasion is large or small. At best we can hope
to separate two forces that might influence evasion: an man￿s greed and his sense of duty
to the community. Recall that these are the two competing views of the motives for tax
evasion we set against each other earlier in the paper. We said people may pay taxes for
instrumental or for moral reasons.
By greed we understand reasons for evading that do not extend beyond the monetary
benefit of the evader. To such an individual penalties for evading and the probability of
being caught evading should figure high in his calculations. Tables 7a-b show a cross-14
tabulation of whether an individual thought himself likely to be caught and the extent of
his evasion as measured by the degree to which he personally evades and the degree to
which he buys goods he knows to be sold without duty.  There are odd gaps in these
tables. At first glance one might surmise that as the perceived probability of being caught
rises the incidence of evasion falls. We have cut the results by category of evader as a
simple form of control. If we find the same tendency for all categories we can be
confident in the robustness of our results. Tables 7a-b are open to wide interpretation, so
what we have done is to calculate correlation coefficients. These strongly suggest that as
the perceived probability of being caught rises, the incidence of evasion falls.
Table 7: Cross-tabulation of probability of being caught with evasion for Czech and
Slovak Republics 2002
Frequency of underground work
Often Occasionally Never Probability of being
caught
CR SR CR SR CR SR
0% 18.9% 30.8% 10.9% 13.2% 7.3% 11.6%
10% 37.8% 7.7% 15.3% 8.8% 6.8% 4.3%
20% 16.2% 15.4% 16.8% 17.6% 7.8% 8.7%
30% 5.4% 7.7% 13.4% 14.7% 8.6% 9.7%
40% 0.0% 7.7% 6.4% 4.4% 7.8% 9.2%
50% 0.0% 0.0% 18.8% 20.6% 20.2% 25.8%
60% 5.4% 7.7% 2.0% 2.9% 4.7% 3.9%
70% 0.0% 15.4% 3.0% 5.9% 5.0% 6.0%
80% 5.4% 7.7% 4.0% 2.9% 8.7% 4.8%
90% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 1.5% 3.4% 3.1%
100% 10.8% 0.0% 7.4% 7.4% 19.7% 12.8%
Note: For Slovakia Spearman’s rho (nonparametric correlation) is 0.139 (p-value 0.00) and for Czech
Republic it is 0.258 (0.00).15
Table 7b: Cross-tabulation of probability of being caught with ￿passive￿ evasion for
Czech and Slovak Republics 2002
Frequency of buying underground goods and services
Often Occasionally Never Probability of being
caught
CR SR CR SR CR SR
0% 11.1% 22.0% 10.1% 10.1% 6.6% 12.8%
10% 25.3% 12.2% 9.6% 4.4% 6.2% 4.4%
20% 13.1% 19.5% 11.4% 7.9% 7.7% 10.6%
30% 8.1% 12.2% 10.9% 11.5% 8.2% 8.8%
40% 4.0% 4.9% 6.1% 11.5% 8.8% 6.2%
50% 9.1% 12.2% 22.1% 26.9% 18.4% 24.2%
60% 3.0% 2.4% 3.5% 4.4% 5.1% 3.5%
70% 5.1% 7.3% 3.5% 5.7% 5.3% 6.6%
80% 6.1% 2.4% 7.9% 4.4% 8.0% 5.3%
90% 2.0% 0.0% 2.4% 3.5% 3.5% 2.6%
100% 13.1% 4.9% 12.5% 9.7% 22.1% 15.0%
Note: For Slovakia Spearman’s rho (nonparametric correlation) is 0.101 (p-value 0.02) and for Czech
Republic it is 0.193 (0.00).
Tables 8a-b cross-tabulate the frequency of evasion with the perceived penalty for
evading. It is difficult to interpret the results of these tables. If we include the whole
range of answers to our questions, including the ￿I don￿t knows￿ a higher perceived
penalty tends to be accompanied (very negative Spearman rank correlation coefficient)
by lower tax evasion in both Czech and Slovak Republics. The Spearman coefficient of
correlation, like all other non-parametric statistics using ordering of values. Once we take
out the value for ￿I don￿t know￿ the correlation we find between evasion and perceived
penalty disappears. Later in the regressions we present, perceived penalty also has no
significant effect on evasion. This does not mean the effect does not exist, but either that
peoples￿ perceptions of the penalty are similar and so our data does not have enough16
variation to pick up an effect, or it may mean that the effect of perceived penalty on
evasion is being dwarfed in our sample by other factors citizens take into mind.
Table 8a: Cross-tabulation of perceived tax penalty with evasion for Czech and
Slovak Republics 2002
Frequency of underground work
Often Occasionally Never Perceived tax
penalties (daily)
CR SR CR SR CR SR
0.10% 18.4% 23.1% 20.1% 8.5% 15.0% 9.9%
0.20% 5.3% 23.1% 6.2% 11.3% 6.7% 8.5%
0.50% 15.8% 0.0% 15.3% 19.7% 14.1% 13.9%
1% 18.4% 0.0% 14.4% 19.7% 16.6% 21.2%
Other 10.5% 7.7% 10.5% 9.9% 8.0% 14.2%
do not know 31.6% 46.2% 33.5% 31.0% 39.6% 32.3%
Note: If we exclude missing [I do not know] observations, for Slovakia Spearman’s rho (nonparametric
correlation) is 0.08 (p-value 0.19) and for Czech Republic it is 0.06 (0.18).
Table 8b: Cross-tabulation of perceived tax penalty with buying goods in the
underground sector for Czech and Slovak Republics 2002
Frequency of buying underground goods and services
Often Occasionally Never Tax penalties (daily)
CR SR CR SR CR SR
0.10% 18.4% 11.6% 17.2% 11.1% 14.4% 8.6%
0.20% 6.8% 14.0% 5.7% 9.8% 7.1% 7.8%
0.50% 16.5% 2.3% 14.3% 15.4% 14.4% 15.5%
1% 19.4% 14.0% 15.7% 20.5% 16.4% 21.6%
Other 8.7% 16.3% 9.4% 12.0% 7.8% 14.2%
do not know 30.1% 41.9% 37.7% 31.2% 39.9% 32.3%
Note: If we exclude missing [I do not know] observations, for Slovakia Spearman’s rho (nonparametric
correlation) is 0.09 (p-value 0.13) and for Czech Republic it is 0.02 (0.6).
As we have emphasized, greed may not be the only reason for evading taxes. A well-
seated conviction that one is not getting quality government services for the money one
pays may play a role in an individual￿s decision to evade. Tables 9 shows that there is a17
relation between how people perceive the quality of government services and the degree
to which they evade taxes.
Table 9: Cross-tabulation of government service index with evasion for Czech and
Slovak Republics 2002
Frequency of underground work
Often Occasionally Never Government service index
 (1=very satisfied,
5=very unsatisfied) CR SR CR SR CR SR
1 0,48 0,25 0,47
2 7,69 9,57 2,82 10,15 1,65
3 31,58 15,38 25,36 5,63 27,54 9,91
4 26,32 15,38 37,80 35,21 40,10 38,21
5 39,47 61,54 24,40 54,93 20,81 48,82
Source: 2002 Survey data, authors￿ computation
Table 10: Cross-tabulation of government service index with buying goods and
services from underground economy for Czech and Slovak Republics 2002




 (1=very satisfied, 5=very
unsatisfied)
CR SR CR SR CR SR
1 4.76 0.21 0.44
2 7.77 7.14 8.58 1.29 11.48 1.75
3 25.24 7.14 25.11 9.48 30.46 10.04
4 30.10 19.05 42.92 37.50 38.85 41.05
5 36.89 61.90 23.18 51.72 18.76 47.16
Source: 2002 Survey data, authors￿ computation18
Table 10 performs the same sort of exercise using as a measure of tax evasion the extent
to which individuals buy goods on which they believe tax has been evaded. The negative
correlation between perceived quality and evasion comes out even more strongly in this
table than in the previous table. The reason may be the following. If willingness to pay
taxes has a strong ￿social-conscience￿ component, then a person who perceives a high
quality of government services may wish to impose his views on others by refusing to
buy goods from the underground economy. Becker (1974) discusses such behaviour in
his theory of social interactions.
Our quality of government services index was but one measure of the manner in which
individuals perceive government. We asked several other questions covering several
more detailed dimensions of government services and correlated these impressions with
the willingness to pay taxes. Our results on these sub-indices conformed to the results
discussed above and are summarized in Table 11.
The following Table 11 shows the cross-correlation of evasion with these questions
measuring quality of the government services. Taken en gros Table 11 suggests that
people who think well of their government are more inclined to pay their taxes than are
people who bear a grudge against the state. The only possible discrepancy in this table is
that those who believed corruption was a big problem tended to evade less than those
who believed corruption was not a problem.  We say ￿possible￿ discrepancy because we
could also surmise that those who see corruption as a major problem could also be those19
who would like to evade taxes but who do not have ability or knowledge to bribe tax
officials.
Table 11: Spearman￿s correlation coefficients of measures of government services
and morality with participation in underground economy for Czech and Slovak
Republics 2002
Buying underground Working underground Scale questions 1 to 5 (1=very
satisfied, absolutely agree;
2=satisfied, agree, etc.) CR SR CR SR
Satisfaction with country
economic development -0.07** -0.03  0.02  0.02
Legal system now and ten
years ago (1=much improved;
5=much worse)
-0.05*  0.02  0.04  0.06
Law and order should be
always obeyed
-0.19*** -0.16*** -0.27*** -0.15***
Is corruption the major
problem of your country? -0.11*** -0.02 -0.13***  0.03
Satisfaction with government
services
-0.11*** -0.05  0.02 -0.05
Is tax evasion moral?  0.31***  0.25***  0.36***  0.21***
Is a misuse of social benefits
moral?
 0.25***  0.18***  0.37***  0.21***
*** Significant on 1%, ** significant on 5%, * significant on 10% levels.
3.2 Interpretations
The skeptical reader may ask whether the person who evades taxes justifies his evasion
by citing that the quality of government services is low. This is a legitimate objection to
our notion that tax evasion is a form of social protest. We answer this objection by the
roundabout means of exploring the relation between evasion and morality. We wish to
see if a person who believes it is moral to evade tends to evade more than a person who20
believes it is not moral to evade. Obviously there is a strong tendency for an individual to
justify evasion by an appeal to morality. Then we wish to see if a person who believes it
is moral to evade also tends to see the quality of government services as being poor.  This
last relation can show up whether those who state the quality of government services is
low do so in order to justify their evasion.
Our survey asked whether a person believed tax evasion to be moral. No one wishes to
think badly of himself. A heavy evader may justify his shirking by suggesting that it is
moral to evade. One component of morality is whether one thinks others will think badly
of one. Table 12a shows a cross-tabulation of evasion with a person￿s belief about how
his family would react to the evasion, taken from our previous 2000 survey. Table 12b is
the same as Table 12a but presents the results from our most recent survey, that in 2002.
Both tables suggest that family approval is positively correlated with evasion.
Table 12a: Percent of respondents cross-tabulated by frequency of underground
work and their assessment of its family reaction (2000)






4=probably do not agree,
5=surely do not agree) CR SR CR SR CR SR
1 38,89 83,33 16,44 15,07 4,46 9,86
2 41,67 38,81 46,58 18,71 22,77
3 16,67 16,67 34,70 30,14 36,98 34,98
4 8,22 6,85 23,88 22,07
5 2,78 1,83 1,37 15,97 10,33
Source: 2000 Survey data, authors￿ computation21
Table 12b: Percent of respondents cross-tabulated by frequency of underground
work and their assessment of its family reaction (2002)






4=probably do not agree,
5=surely do not agree) CR SR CR SR CR SR
1 55,26 46,15 17,70 15,49 5,20 8,49
2 34,21 38,46 54,07 50,70 26,02 24,76
3 7,89 10,05 11,27 15,99 12,50
4 2,63 7,69 16,27 21,13 31,47 32,08
5 7,69 1,91 1,41 21,32 22,17
Source: 2002 Survey data, authors￿ computation
We also asked respondents to assess their own tax morality directly. Table 13 shows a
cross-tabulation of our evasion variable with a morality variable. As could be expected,
there is a strong positive correlation between the frequency of evasion and a belief that
evasion is moral.
Table 13a: Cross-tabulation of morality with frequency of evasion for Czech and
Slovak Republics 2000





5=strongly immoral) CR SR CR SR CR SR
1 17,65 16,67 2,70 0,41 2,32
2 26,47 50,00 18,92 27,40 7,19 12,53
3 50,00 33,33 59,01 61,64 43,57 50,35
 4 2,94 18,47 10,96 40,11 28,07
5 2,94 0,90 8,71 6,73
Source: 2000 Survey data, authors￿ computation22
Table 13b: Cross-tabulation of morality with frequency of evasion for Czech and
Slovak Republics 2002





CR SR CR SR CR SR
1 8,11 2,00 7,14 0,92 4,60
2 27,03 83,93 15,50 8,57 4,86 2,42
3 56,76 16,07 63,00 48,57 37,71 35,59
4 8,11 17,00 15,71 40,08 25,67
5 2,50 20,00 16,43 31,72
Source: 2002 Survey data, authors￿ computation
Feeling that evasion is a moral activity may have something to do with whether one
perceives the quality of government goods one receives to be unsatisfactory given the
amount of tax one pays. Table 14 cross-tabulates self-reported measures of whether one
believes tax evasion to be moral with beliefs about the quality of government services.
Table 14: Cross-tabulation of morality with government service index for Czech and
Slovak Republics 2000
Government service index





CR SR CR SR CR SR CR SR CR SR
1 50,00 1,00 10,00 0,74 2,17 1,02 3,21 3,07 6,07
2 50,00 14,00 7,81 4,35 5,58 3,74 9,21 4,05
3 66,67 29,00 30,00 43,49 32,61 45,43 35,83 46,05 41,30
4 33,33 34,00 20,00 36,80 34,78 36,80 31,55 27,63 15,79
5 22,00 40,00 11,15 26,09 11,17 25,67 14,04 32,79
Source: 2000 Survey data, authors￿ computation23
The table shows no obvious pattern of correlation and formal calculations of correlation
failed to turn up any significant relation between the variables on either axis of the table.
This is an encouraging result in the sense that morality, as a deep disposition, should not
influence perception. It seems that, using tabular analysis, the correlation we found
between the perceived quality of government services and tax evasion is not spurious.
3.2 Multivariate Analysis
Cross-tabulations can give us clues about the relations between variables but suffer from
their limited-dimensionality.  The present section is a brief multivariate analysis that tries
to isolate the effect of perceived quality of government services and the willingness to
evade taxes. Tables 15 shows the degree of tax evasion (frequent=1, sometimes=2,
never=3) regressed on education, and sex, whether a person saw his economic situation
deteriorate from the previous year, the gap between his actual and desired income, his
assessed probability and penalty for being caught, and his perceived quality of
government services. The first column of regression coefficients suggests that Czech and
Slovak taxpayers evade for both instrumental and protest reasons.24
Table 15. Results of the logit estimation. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Marginal effects ∂ P/∂ x on evading














































































Is your household worse



















































Observations 490 901 901
R-square adj. 0.162 0.109 0.106
* Significant on 10 percent level, 
** Significant on 5 percent level, 
*** Significant on 1 percent level..
Marginal effects by rows must sum to zero as the probabilities must sum to one and the marginal effects are
the derivatives of the probabilities.
The higher the assessed probability of being caught, and the higher the perceived quality
of government services, the lower the level of tax evasion. More specifically, a one point
increase in the dissatisfaction with government services leads to a 5% greater chance of25
someone becoming a frequent evader and a 12% lesser chance of someone staying in the
category of never evading. The problem with this first column of coefficients is that 411
respondents (nearly 46 percent of the sample) could not be analyzed because they did not
provide an answer to how large they believed is the size of the penalty for evasion. If
there is a systematic reason for not answering this question our regression may suffer
from selection bias. The second column of Table 15 provide analysis without perceived
penalty, while the third column reintroduces these non-respondents by adding a dummy
variable which has 1 for respondents and 0 for non-respondents to the question of what
the perceived penalty is. This reintroduces non-respondents into the sample without
biasing other coefficients. The penalty variable is not significant , however quality of
government service retains its significance.
4. Conclusion
The present paper has analysed tax evasion in the Czech and Slovak Republics by using a
2002 survey of 1089 Czechs and 501 Slovaks. We also analysed a more limited survey of
Hungary and Poland. We have focused our attention on whether people who believe they
are getting quality services are more willing to pay their taxes than are the disgruntled.
We wish to do this in order to help governments develop efficient, minimally intrusive
tools for encouraging people to pay taxes. The prevailing thinking in government and
among academics has been that coercion is the way to get people to pay. Tax withholding
already takes away much choice from individuals and the threat of audits and penalties is
sustained by thousands of civil servants who form an elite caste of government with26
extraordinary powers of coercion. Economists by and large have made punitive
enforcement the subject of their theoretical studies. Very few are those who have
suggested that people may be convinced to pay their taxes without being prodded by
inspectors. Friedrich Schneider is among the few to have suggested that tax evasion may
be a form of protest against government. In all  four countries of our survey we found
strongly that those who believe they are getting quality government services also tend to
evade much less than those who do not believe they are getting quality services. A
government keen on reducing tax evasion cannot just bark commands at its subjects.
Governments are constrained in their tax collection by the perceptions people have of the
quality of government services they receive. The Soviets used to say of their leaders
￿You pretend to pay us, and we pretend to work.￿ The present paper suggests that
governments that pretend to provide quality services will preside over a mass that
pretends to respect the tax code.
 We noted that tax evasion by individuals is on the rise in both republics. We sought to
explain why people evade taxes in both republics and found that, among other forces
driving tax evasion, the willingness of citizens to pay increases as they perceive the
quality of government services to be good. A similar finding holds for Hungary, and
Poland, though our survey for these countries was more limited than that for the Czech
and Slovak Republics.27
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Appendix A
Table A1: Structure of informal sector in Czech Republic: relative % shares
Active engagement in informal activities
Purchase of informal goods/ services
Have you ever had.. ? Informal Salary [CZK]
Total
sample
Often Sometimes Never Often Sometimes Never <10000 <10000,
15000 ) >=15000
Total 1041 103 470 464 38 209 788 154 14 9
Sex
Male 49,3 60,2 51,1 45,5 73,7 59,8 45,6 60,4 50,0 88,9
Female 50,7 39,8 48,9 54,5 26,3 40,2 54,4 39,6 50,0 11,1
Age
18 to 25 years 18,8 19,4 19,4 18,1 21,1 23,9 17,3 25,3 21,4 11,1
26 to 35 years 23,2 20,4 25,3 21,6 15,8 27,3 22,5 25,3 7,1 22,2
36 to 45 years 20,6 21,4 20,6 20,5 26,3 22,5 19,7 25,3 21,4 22,2
46 to 55 years 22,8 30,1 20,6 23,1 23,7 16,7 24,5 15,6 21,4 44,4
56 to 65 years 14,7 8,7 14,0 16,8 13,2 9,6 16,1 8,4 28,6 0,0
Level of education
Primary 18,7 23,3 17,7 18,8 21,1 19,6 18,4 20,1 21,4 11,1
Without GCE 38,8 36,9 42,1 36,0 39,5 43,1 37,7 44,2 21,4 22,2
With GCE 32,6 29,1 31,9 34,1 34,2 31,6 32,6 33,1 50,0 44,4
Higher 9,9 10,7 8,3 11,2 5,3 5,7 11,3 2,6 7,1 22,2
Level of income[CZK]
< 10.000 46,8 42,7 48,1 46,1 31,6 39,7 49,4 39,6 14,3 11,1
10.001 to 15.000 32,2 33,0 29,1 35,3 34,2 33,0 31,9 39,0 35,7 11,1
15.001 to 20.000 11,0 12,6 11,7 9,9 13,2 14,4 9,9 14,3 21,4 11,1
20.001 to 25.000 3,4 3,9 4,5 2,2 7,9 5,7 2,5 4,5 21,4 22,2
25.001 to 30.000 1,7 2,9 2,1 1,1 2,6 3,8 1,1 1,3 7,1 22,2
30.001 to 40.000 0,4 1,0 0,4 0,2 2,6 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 11,1
40.001 to 50.000 0,3 1,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,5 0,3 0,0 0,0 11,1
>= 50.001 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
Rejected answer 4,2 2,9 3,6 5,0 7,9 2,9 4,4 1,3 0,0 0,030
Table A2: Structure of informal sector in Slovak Republic: relative % shares
Active engagement in informal activities
Purchase of informal goods/ services
Have you ever had.. ? Informal Salary [CZK]
Total
sample
Often Sometimes Never Often Sometimes Never <10000 <10000,
15000 ) >=15000
Total 509 43 234 232 13 71 424 50 1 1
Sex
Male 51,9 65,1 56,8 44,4 92,3 69,0 47,9 72,0 100,0 100,0
Female 48,1 34,9 43,2 55,6 7,7 31,0 52,1 28,0 0,0 0,0
Age
18 to 25 years 13,4 11,6 15,0 12,1 23,1 14,1 13,0 10,0 0,0 0,0
26 to 35 years 29,1 30,2 30,8 27,2 30,8 36,6 27,6 38,0 0,0 0,0
36 to 45 years 30,3 44,2 27,8 30,2 38,5 29,6 30,2 28,0 100,0 100,0
46 to 55 years 21,4 14,0 21,8 22,4 7,7 14,1 23,1 18,0 0,0 0,0
56 to 65 years 5,9 0,0 4,7 8,2 0,0 5,6 6,1 6,0 0,0 0,0
Level of education
Primary 6,5 9,3 6,4 6,0 15,4 5,6 6,4 8,0 0,0 0,0
Without GCE 39,1 44,2 38,9 38,4 23,1 52,1 37,3 46,0 0,0 0,0
With GCE 41,5 32,6 44,9 39,7 61,5 32,4 42,5 40,0 100,0 100,0
Higher 13,0 14,0 9,8 15,9 0,0 9,9 13,9 6,0 0,0 0,0
Level of income[CZK]
< 10.000 60,5 69,8 56,4 62,9 46,2 56,3 61,6 62,0 0,0 0,0
10.001 to 15.000 25,5 11,6 31,2 22,4 38,5 25,4 25,2 34,0 0,0 0,0
15.001 to 20.000 5,5 4,7 5,1 5,2 0,0 5,6 5,7 2,0 0,0 0,0
20.001 to 25.000 2,2 4,7 1,7 2,2 0,0 2,8 2,1 0,0 0,0 0,0
25.001 to 30.000 0,8 2,3 0,9 0,4 0,0 1,4 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,0
30.001 to 40.000 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,4 0,0 1,4 0,0 2,0 0,0 0,0
40.001 to 50.000 0,2 0,0 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0




TIME FILL ACTUAL TIME HOURS
A MINUTES
QUESTIONS ABOUT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY
RSEX SEX OF RESPONDENT MALE 1
FEMALE 2
AGE HOW OLD ARE YOU?
LIMIT SAMPLE: AGE BETWEEN 18 AND 65
EKO YES 1 ARE YOU ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE AT
PRESENT?
NO 2
(*LIMIT THE SURVEY ONLY TO ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE PERSONS)
REDU YOUR HIGHEST ACHIEVED PRIMARY 1
EDUCATION LEVEL: APPRENTICESHIP ( 2 YEARS) 2
APPRENTICESHIP ( 3-4 YEARS), WITHOUT
GCE 3
SECONDARY VOCATIONAL WITH GCE 4
GRAMMAR SCHOOL WITH GCE 5
HIGHER 6
WITHOUT SCHOOL EDUCATION 8
RINC CHOOSE A RANGE OF YOUR NET LESS THAN 10.000 KČ 1
MONTHLY INCOME; INCLUDING 10.001 ￿ 15.000 Kč 2
SOCIAL BENEFITS: 15.001 ￿ 20.000 Kč 3
20.001 ￿ 25.000 Kč 432
25.001 ￿ 30.000 Kč 5
30.001 ￿ 40.000 Kč 6
40.001 ￿ 50.000 Kč 7
MORE THAN 50.001 KČ 8
REJECTING A RESPONSE (DO NOT OFFER) 9
HINC CHOOSE A RANGE OF YOUR LESS THAN 10.000 KČ 1
HOUSEHOLD 10.001 ￿ 20.000 Kč 2
NET MONTHLY INCOME; 20.001 ￿ 30.000 Kč 3
INCLUDING SOCIAL BENEFITS 30.001 ￿ 50.000 Kč 4
50.001 ￿ 75.000 Kč 5
75.001 ￿ 100.000 Kč 6
MORE THAN 100.001 Kč 7
REJECTING A RESPONSE (DO NOT OFFER) 8
A01 DOES ANY MEMBER OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD YES 1
RECEIVE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS? NO 2
A02 WHAT IS A MINIMAL MONTHLY INCOME, WHICH SHOULD
COVER NEEDS OF YOUR HOUSEHOLD IN YEAR 2002?
A03 WHAT ARE THE AVERAGE HOUSING
MONTHLY EXPENDITURES OF YOUR TELECOMMUNICATION
HOUSEHOLD ON FOLLOWING ITEMS: ELECTRICITY
All numbers in CZK OTHER
A04 WHAT IS THE AMOUNT OF CASH YOU ON AVERAGE HOLD IN A
WEEK TIME? All numbers in CZK
A05 YOUR CURRENT FAMILY IS STRONGLY HIGHER 1
INCOME WHEN IS A BIT HIGHER 2
COMPARING WITH THE IS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME 3
INCOME IN YEAR 2001: IS A BIT LOWER 4
IS STRONGLY LOWER 5
A06 YOUR CURRENT FAMILY IS STRONGLY HIGHER 1
INCOME WHEN IS A BIT HIGHER 2
COMPARING WITH THE IS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME 3
INCOME FIVE YEARS AGO: IS A BIT LOWER 4
IS STRONGLY LOWER 533
A07 YOU SURELY KNOW THAT THERE IS ALSO
INFORMAL / SHADOW ECONOMY IN THE CZECH
YES 1
(SLOVAK) REPUBLIC. NO 2
EXPLAIN THE TERM „SHADOW ECONOMY“
A08A ACCORDING TO YOU, HOW MANY ADULT PEOPLE OUT OF TEN IN THE CZECH
REPUBLIC HAVE ALSO AN INCOME FROM SHADOW ECONOMY
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A08B ACCORDING TO YOU, HOW MANY ADULT PEOPLE OUT OF TEN IN YOUR
NEIGHBORHOOD HAVE ALSO AN INCOME FROM SHADOW ECONOMY?
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A09 DO YOU THINK THAT STRONGLY MORAL 1
TO HAVE AN UNDECLARED MORAL 2
(UNTAXED) INCOME IS: NEITHER MORAL, NOR IMMORAL 3
IMMORAL 4
STRONGLY IMMORAL 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A10 WHAT WILL BE A REACTION THEY SURELY AGREE 1
OF YOUR FAMILY AND THEY PROBABLY AGREE 2
FRIENDS IF THEY FIND OUT THEY PROBABLY DO NOT AGREE 3
THAT YOU HAVE UNDECLARED - THEY SURELY DO NOT AGREE 4
(UNTAXED) INCOME? I DO NOT KNOW 98
A11 SUPPOSE YOU OWE TO THE
STATE TAX PAYMENT IN
AMOUNT 100.000 KČ. HOW
MANY, DO YOU THINK YOU
HAVE TO PAY A PENALTY
AFTER A YEAR
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A12 ON A SCALE OF 0 TO A 100, SUPPOSING THAT 0 IS BEING SURE YOU WILL NOT
BE CAUGHT AND 100 BEING SURE YOU WILL BE, WHAT WOULD BE THE
NUMBER CORRESPONDING TO THE RISK OF YOUR BEING CAUGHT BUYING
UNDECLARED GOODS AND SERVICES (OR JOBS)?
A13 ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE VERY SATISFIED 1
POLITICAL SYSTEM (DEMOCRACY) IS SATISFIED 2




I DO NOT KNOW 98
A14 ARE YOU SATISFIED WITH THE VERY SATISFIED 1
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF YOUR SATISFIED 2




I DO NOT KNOW 98
A15 IF YOU COMPARED THE FUNCTIONING MUCH IMPROVED 1
OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN YOUR SLIGHTLY IMPROVED 2
COUNTRY NOW AND 10 YEARS AGO, UNCHANGED 3
WHICH STATEMENT WOULD BEST FIT SLIGHTLY WORSE 4
YOUR EVALUATION? MUCH WORSE 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A16 IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE LAW SHOULD VERY MUCH AGREE 1
ALWAYS BE OBEYED. DO YOU AGREE SLIGHTLY AGREE 2
WITH THIS STATEMENT? NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 3
SLIGHTLY DISAGREE 4
VERY MUCH DISAGREE 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A17 CURRENTLY THE CORRUPTION (ESP. IN
THE PUBLIC SECTOR) IS FREQUENTLY
VERY MUCH AGREE 1
CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF MAJOR SLIGHTLY AGREE 2
PROBLEMS OF YOUR COUNTRY. TO NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 3
WHAT EXTENT DO YOU AGREE WITH SLIGHTLY DISAGREE 4
THIS STATEMENT? VERY MUCH DISAGREE 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A18 IF THE CHANCE TO BE CAUGHT VERY HIGH 1
WHEN EVADING TAXES WERE HIGH 2
ZERO, WHAT WOULD BE THE LOW 3
PROBABILITY THAT YOU VERY LOW 4
ENGAGED INTO SUCH
ACTIVITY?
I DO NOT KNOW 98
THERE ARE DIFFERENT POLICIES PROPOSED TO FIGHT THE TAX EVASION. DO YOU PERSONALLY
BELIEVE THAT IN YOUR COUNTRY:35
A19A IF THE PROBABILITY TO BE FALL A LOT 1
CAUGHT WERE TO DOUBLE FALL SLIGHTLY 2
THE AMOUNT OF TAX EVASION NOT CHANGE 3
WOULD: INCREASE SLIGHTLY 4
INCREASE A LOT 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A19B IF THE PENALTY WHEN FALL A LOT 1
CAUGHT EVADING TAXES WERE FALL SLIGHTLY 2
TO DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF NOT CHANGE 3
TAX EVASION WOULD: INCREASE SLIGHTLY 4
INCREASE A LOT 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A19C IF TAXES WERE LEVIED BY THE FALL A LOT 1
EUROPEAN UNION INSTEAD OF FALL SLIGHTLY 2
THE GOVERNMENT OF YOUR NOT CHANGE 3
COUNTRY THE AMOUNT OF TAX INCREASE SLIGHTLY 4
EVASION WOULD: INCREASE A LOT 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A20 DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE WITHOUT ANY DOUBT MORAL 1
MISUSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY MORE MORAL THAN IMMORAL 2
BENEFITS IS: NEITHER MORAL NOR IMMORAL 3
MORE IMMORAL THAN MORAL 4
WITHOUT ANY DOUBT IMMORAL 5
I DO NOT KNOW 98
A21 WHAT PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS ARE MISUSING SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFITS IN YOUR COUNTRY?
A22 HAVE YOU EVER BOUGHT GOODS AND SERVICES COMING FROM AN UNDECLARED




A23 HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ENGAGED IN UNDECLARED SECTOR?36




A24 WHAT IS YOUR INCOME FROM LESS THAN 10.000 KČ 1
UNDECLARED JOB 10.001 ￿ 15.000 KČ 2
15.001 ￿ 20.000 KČ 3
20.001 ￿ 25.000 KČ 4
25.001 ￿ 30.000 KČ 5
30.001 ￿ 35.000 KČ 6
35.001 ￿ 40.000 KČ 7
MORE THAN 40.001 KČ 8
NOT RESPONDING 9
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION
TIME Fill actual time HOURS
B MINUTES
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
SIZE Size of town: LESS THAN 999 HABITANTS 1
1000 - 4999 HABITANTS 2
5000-19999 HABITANTS 3
20000-99999 HABITANTS 4
100000 AND MORE HABITANTS 5










Table C1. Values and 95%-confidence intervals for relative frequencies of different level of
tax evasion. Hungary 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002.
Year Often Sometimes Never
3,2% 12,6% 84,2%
1997
(2,0%, 4,4%) (10,5%, 14,7%) (81,9%, 86,5%)
3,9% 21,3% 74,9%
2000
(2,6%, 5,1%) (18,7%, 23,9%) (72,1%, 77,6%)
3,7% 20,2% 76,1%
2002
(2,5%, 4,9%) (17,7%, 22,7%) (73,4%, 78,8%)
Figure 1: Graphs for 95% confidence intervals
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Table C2. Values and 95%-confidence intervals for relative frequencies of different level of
tax evasion. Poland 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002.
Year Often Sometimes Never
1,1% 8,0% 90,9%
1997
(0,0%, 2,2%) (5,4%, 10,6%) (88,2%, 93,6%)
1,3% 13,5% 85,2%
2000
(0,1%, 2,5%) (10,3%, 16,7%) (81,9%, 88,5%)
2,6% 14,0% 83,5%
2002
(1,1%, 4,1%) (10,9%, 17,1%) (80,2%, 86,8%)
Figure 2: Graphs for 95% confidence intervals
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Table C3: Cross-tabulation of government service index with evasion for Poland and
Hungary 2002





PL HU PL HU PL HU
1 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,3% 0,4%
2 5,3% 14,3% 8,7% 5,0% 13,5% 10,7%
3 15,8% 0,0% 30,4% 15,0% 21,3% 38,3%
4 42,1% 57,1% 39,1% 50,0% 38,9% 32,1%
5 36,8% 28,6% 21,7% 30,0% 25,9% 18,6%
PL Spearman rho -0.03 (0.43)
HU Spearman rho -0.09 (0.01)
Source: 2002 Survey data, authors￿ computation